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5.1  Introduction 
New electronic trading technologies have drastically reduced the costs of 
financial transactions and put tremendous pressure on financial exchanges to 
lower their costs. In  1986, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) responded to 
these pressures by  switching from a closed, floor-based, broker-dealer market 
to an open electronic quotation system dubbed SEAQ. The LSE’s SEAQ sys- 
tem operates much like the National Association of Securities Dealers’ Nasdaq 
dealer system. On SEAQ, competing market makers post bid and ask prices 
and guaranteed trade sizes. Although SEAQ also displays trade information, 
brokers and dealers still negotiate trades by phone. Besides changing its quota- 
tion systems, the LSE enacted new rules designed to encourage competition 
and narrow quoted spreads. These rules included the elimination of fixed com- 
missions and member entry barriers, and the adoption of best execution rules. 
The exchange also imposed minimum quote sizes. The minimum quote size 
for a security is the number of shares market makers must stand ready to trade 
at their posted prices. On SEAQ, these minimums are large, equaling 2, and 
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sometimes more, percent of  a security’s average daily trading volume. To re- 
duce the capital risks associated with large trades, the exchange granted market 
makers the right to delay their disclosure. During  1991, SEAQ delayed releas- 
ing information on large trades for up to ninety minutes. Currently, they delay 
disclosing information on extremely large trades for up to one week! 
The LSE’s  emphasis  on  liquidity  over transparency  has  renewed  debate 
about whether such rules affect the costs of  financial transactions. A recent 
International Organization of Securities Commissions report ( 1993) observed 
that few studies have examined the determinants of transaction costs in dealer- 
ship markets. Several empirical studies report substantial intersecurity and in- 
terday variation in Nasdaq and SEAQ dealer spreads. Few examine the rela- 
tionship between  spreads and transaction  prices, or consider how  exchange 
rules might affect  spreads. This paper uses newly available  SEAQ intraday 
quotation  and transaction  data to analyze the  relationship between  investor 
transaction costs and best bid-ask spreads. Using unique information in SEAQ 
data, we show that LSE rules lead dealers to offer systematic discounts from 
posted prices. These discounts vary across traders, securities, and trade charac- 
teristics. 
We also argue that conventional transaction cost measures do not recognize 
important institutional features of dealership markets. On SEAQ, these include 
minimum  quote  sizes and best  execution  rules.  These rules  affect  dealers’ 
quoted prices and their willingness to offer traders discounts. Contrary to the 
assumptions of many theoretical models, SEAQ market makers do not com- 
pete by narrowing (symmetric) quotes. Indeed, they almost never narrow the 
quoted spread between their bid and ask prices. They instead compete by posi- 
tioning their bid or ask on or at the market bid or offer. Curiously, they may 
maintain these positions for hours or days, offering traders discounts instead 
of changing what they advertise on SEAQ screens. We find, as some theoretical 
models do, that dealer discounts usually increase with the size of a trade. We 
also find puzzles. Surprisingly, discounts for customers, brokers, and market 
makers all decrease with market-maker concentration and increase with mar- 
ket depth. These heterogeneities raise new theoretical and empirical questions 
about how dealer competition affects the relation between quoted prices and 
transaction prices. 
Section 5.2 begins with a review of prior research on transaction costs, par- 
ticularly transaction costs in dealer markets. We then show that several stan- 
dard transaction cost measures may over- or underrepresent dealer discounts 
from quoted  spreads. We illustrate our arguments using  SEAQ and Nasdaq 
intraday trade and quotation data for Cadbury Schweppes, a heavily  traded 
FTSE- 100 (Financial Times-Stock  Exchange) equity. We find that SEAQ Cad- 
bury  quoted bid-ask  spreads are slightly higher than  Nasdaq  spreads.  More 
notable are differences in the price discounts offered by Nasdaq and SEAQ 
market makers. Though some research suggests that dealers offer only other 
dealers discounts from quoted prices, this is not true on SEAQ. SEAQ market 127  Transaction Costs in Dealer Markets 
makers grant discounts to medium and large retail orders more often than they 
do to each other. The median retail discount increases uniformly with order 
size, and applies to many orders larger than the Cadbury minimum quote size. 
We conclude the Cadbury example by developing a new measure of transaction 
costs, what we term the adjusted apparent spread. This measure reveals how 
dealers  vary  spreads  and  discounts  with  trade  characteristics. We  estimate 
these adjusted apparent spreads using quantile regression techniques. These 
regressions flexibly describe the distribution of Cadbury discounts conditional 
on trade size and trader identities. 
Section 5.3 analyzes 1991 quotation data for 1,887 U.K. and Irish equities 
to isolate inter- and intrasecunty variations in quoted prices. We find striking 
variation. Best bid-ask spreads range from less than  1 percent of  share value 
to over 50 percent! Much of this variation is systematic. As on Nasdaq, quoted 
and best bid-ask spreads decline as the number of posting market makers in- 
creases. It also appears that greater capital risks associated with higher mini- 
mum quote sizes may cause market makers to widen their spreads. Dealer par- 
ticipation in actively “making the market” also falls as turnover increases. At 
any instant, nearly one-third of the market makers in a heavily traded equity 
post noncompetitive prices. While our empirical methods do not disentangle 
the interplay among dealer concentration,  spreads, and volume, we examine 
whether trade-size economies or order-processing  costs could explain these 
correlations. We find limited evidence that they do. 
Section 5.4 analyzes a smaller sample of  sixty SEAQ securities divided 
equally among three market capitalization classes. Conventional transaction 
cost statistics imply that each capitalization class has best bid-ask spreads com- 
parable to Nasdaq spreads. Our conditional apparent spread measures show 
that transaction costs for individual securities differ substantially because of 
differences in the extent of discounting. Some of these differences occur be- 
cause trade characteristics differ across market capitalization classes. For in- 
stance, FTSE- 100  equities appear to have lower transaction costs because they 
have relatively more discounted interdealer trades. Other differences occur be- 
cause market makers and brokers charge different customers different prices. 
The median customer trade is never discounted by market makers, but nonreg- 
istered  dealers give their median  customers substantial  discounts.  We  also 
show that market makers appear unwilling to give each other price breaks over 
the phone, but do when trading anonymously through interdealer brokers. Fi- 
nally, we find some evidence that large orders receive greater discounts in less 
concentrated markets. 
5.2  Measuring Transaction Costs in Dealer Markets 
Investors incur several types of transaction costs each time they trade. These 
include commissions, differences between purchase and sale prices, and costs 
related to the price impact of  trades. This paper exclusively analyzes differ- 128  Peter C. Reiss and Ingrid M. Werner 
ences between purchase and sales prices. We analyze spreads largely because 
we do not have detailed data on commissions. In 1991, the exchange estimated 
that commissions on trades between &50,001  and E100,OOO averaged 0.23 per- 
cent of  price.  Smaller round lots paid  as much  as 6.11 percent,  and orders 
greater than &1,000,000  an average of 0.15 percent.’ These commissions only 
accentuate the spread-related size discounts we report below. 
Prior theoretical and empirical market microstructure research has devoted 
considerable effort to modeling how market makers set spreads. Most concep- 
tual models focus on a single market maker or specialist. These models show 
how factors such as limit order competition and a trade’s size affect specialists’ 
spreads. Many models, for instance, conclude that larger trades will be charged 
larger spreads. In inventory models, this occurs because of  inventory risk; in 
adverse selection models, it occurs because large trades move prices.? 
Empirical research  on the determinants of  spreads has struggled with the 
question of  how to estimate transaction costs when transaction prices differ 
from dealers’ posted quotes. Much of this research relies on New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) intraday transaction and quotation data. This research re- 
veals that specialists vary their spreads in  systematic ways  (e.g., Brock and 
Kleidon  [1992]; McInish  and  Wood  [1992];  and  Foster  and  Viswanathan 
[ 19931). These findings have inspired new theoretical models of trade between 
different types of investors and market intermediaries. 
Fewer papers have modeled the behavior of  market makers in dealer quota- 
tion markets.  Models by  Ho and Stoll (1983), Grossman and Miller (1988), 
Glosten (1992), Madhavan  (1992), Biais (1993), Dennert (1993), and others 
show that strategic interactions among market makers can considerably com- 
plicate relationships between spreads and trade characteristics. Consider, for 
example, the conclusion cited above that specialists will charge large orders 
larger spreads. In dealership markets, such a policy would give large traders 
an incentive to split trades among dealers. Absent centralized information on 
the identities of traders, dealers will have a harder time identifying and pricing 
informed trades. Recently, Glosten (1994) has shown that minimum tick sizes 
may similarly constrain dealers’ abilities to charge large orders high spreads. 
His model also provides some intuition for how SEAQ minimum quote sizes 
may affect spreads. By forcing dealers to accept large and small trades at the 
same price, SEAQ rules on minimum quote size give market makers incentives 
to widen  spreads. By  widening  spreads, SEAQ market  makers can protect 
themselves against inventory imbalances and informed trades while simultane- 
ously retaining an option  to offer execution  within  their guaranteed quotes. 
What is unclear is whether competition will force market makers to offer dis- 
counts. Studies of NYSE specialists suggest that they offer only small orders 
I. Quality of Markets Review, Summer 1991 (London: London Stock Exchange, 1991), 17-24. 
2.  Some of  these predictions carry over to models of  dealer markets. For papers that model 
inventory risks, see, e.g., Garman (1976);  Amihud and Mendelson (1980); and Ho and Stoll(l981, 
1983). Admati (1991) surveys papers that model adverse selection risks. 129  Transaction Costs in Dealer Markets 
discounts. Large floor trades receive less favorable execution at or outside the 
bid and ask.3 
Few studies have examined the relation between quoted prices and transac- 
tion  prices in dealer markets.  Some descriptions  of Nasdaq claim that only 
interdealer or Instinet transactions  trade within  the quoted spread. A recent 
study by the LSE’s Quality of Markets Group estimated that nearly 35 percent 
of SEAQ trades occur within the best bid-ask ~pread.~  Some researchers specu- 
late that these are interdealer trades. Others interpret this statistic as evidence 
that SEAQ quoted prices do not contain much information. The LSE’s Quality 
of  Markets Review and Neuberger  and  Schwartz  (1989) report  that  not  all 
trades within the spread are dealer trades. These comparisons do not  show, 
however, whether other characteristics also affect discounts. The analysis be- 
low shows that while many trades within the best bid-ask spread on SEAQ are 
interdealer  trades,  large  customer trades  also receive  favorable  execution. 
Small and very large trades usually do not.s We now illustrate how trader iden- 
tities and other factors affect SEAQ transaction costs. 
5.2.1  Cadbury Schweppes: An Introductory Example 
We begin our analysis of SEAQ transaction costs by analyzing what conven- 
tional  transaction  cost measures  reveal  about  the cost  of  trading  Cadbury 
Schweppes, a heavily traded FTSE- 100 stock. We analyze Cadbury for several 
reasons. First, by  focusing on a single security we can more clearly describe 
SEAQ trading rules that might affect transaction costs. Second, during the pe- 
riod we studied Cadbury Schweppes, market makers had to accept trades as 
large as E100,OOO-quite  large by Nasdaq and SEAQ standards. Third, Cad- 
bury Schweppes shares also trade on Nasdaq as American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs). This dual trading of Cadbury shares allows us to compare transaction 
costs in two very similar dealer markets. 
The Cadbury SEAQ data come from separate settlement and quotation re- 
cords maintained by the LSE. The Nasdaq data come from the Institute for the 
Study  of  Security  Markets.  Subsequent sections and an  appendix  describe 
these data in greater detail. Table 5.1 provides conventional descriptive statis- 
tics on Cadbury transactions during 1991. The top section of the table contains 
transaction costs statistics developed in prior studies. Following convention, 
we express each as a percentage of Cadbury’s average share price. For compari- 
son, we also convert each to a pound sterling estimate of the spread cost on a 
median-size SEAQ trade (roughly 1,500 shares). These measures convey very 
3. Lee (1993) finds liquidity premiums, defined as an absolute difference between trade prices 
and the bid-ask midpoints, that increase with trade size. 
4. See Stock  Exchange  Quarterly and Quality of  Markets Review:  Spring  Edition (London: 
London Stock Exchange, 1992),  27. 
5.  SEAQ does not require market makers to offer best execution to very large trades. For addi- 
tional evidence on SEAQ size discounts, see Breedon (1993); De Jong, Nijman, and Roe11 (1993); 
and Hansch and Neuberger (1993). Table 5.1  SEAQ and Nasdaq Descriptive Statistics for Cadbury Schweppes 
SEAQ  Nasdaq 
Cost for Median 
SEAQ Trade 
Cost for Median 
SEAQ Trade 
Average Transaction Cost Measure  Percent of Price  (pounds)  Percent of Price  (pounds) 
Touch spread"  0.85  49.90  0.71  41.68 
Roll's spread"  0.73  42.86  0.53  31.12 
Effective spread'  0.72  42.27  0.60  35.23 
Effective spread excluding trades outside touch  0.70  41.10  0.58  34.05 
Weighted effective spreadd  0.63  36.99  0.50  29.36 
Weighted effective spread excluding trades outside 
touch  0.54  3  I .70  0.47  27.59 
Percent Distribution of Trades by  Value  Number  Value  Number 
Trades outside touch 
Trades at touch 
Trades inside touch 
7.6  2.3 
40.8  70.8 
51.6  26.9 
2.3  I .6 
65.9  78.3 





Average as  SEAQ Trade 




Average as  Trade 
Percent of Price  (pounds) 
All trades' 
Excluding trades outside 
touch 
0.075  4.40 
0.085  4.99 
0.052  3.05 
0.063  3.70 
Percent Distribution of  the Touch by 
Minutes Market  Times When  Value of Trades  Minutes Market  Times When  Value of Tradcs 
Is Open  Trades Occur  Occurring  Is Open  Trades Occur  Occurring 
Touch < -0.01  pence  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1 -0.01  5 Touch < 0.50 pence 
0.50 5 Touch < 1 .SO pence 
1.50 5 Touch < 2.50 pence 
2.50 5 Touch < 3.50 pence 
3.50 5 Touch < 4.50 pence 
4.50 5 Touch < 5.50 pence 
5.50 5 Touch < 6.50 pence 
6.50 5 Touch <  7.50 pence 
Average touch by  time (pence) 
Intraday standard deviation (pence) 
























































Average transaction price (pounds) 
Number of market makers 
Capital risk at minimum quote size (pounds)' 
Number of trades 
Average trade size (pounds) 
Median trade size (pounds) 














24 I ,99  I 
Sources: SEAQ data were drawn from the LSE computer records for the periods January  14-March  18, April 2-June  24, July  I-September  24, and October 14- 
December 27, 1991. The missing periods are due to retrieval problems. Nasdaq data were drawn from the Institute for the Study of  Security Markets tapes for January 
1-December  31, 1991. All statistics exclude trades before 830  (9:OO) A.M. and after 4:30 (4:OO) P.M. for SEAQ (Nasdaq). 
"he  touch spread is the average across transactions of 100 (Ask-Bid)fkade  Price. 
hRoll's spread measure is two times the square root of minus the serial covariance of price changes. 
'The effective spread is the average across transactions of 2 X  100 X ]Trade  Price -  (Best Ask + Best Bid)/21/Trade Price. 
"he  volume-weighted average of the equation in note c. See Lee and Ready (1991) 
<The average discount is the average across transactions of  100 X  [Trade Price - Best Quotel/Trade Price, where the Best Quote is the bid (ask) for a customer 
sell (buy). 
'Capital risk is calculated based on the average stock price. The minimum quote size for Cadbury Schweppes is twenty-five thousand shares on SEAQ. Exceptions are 
given for two market-making firms who may post smaller quote sizes. The maximum quote size for Nasdaq trading of Cadbury Schweppes was one thousand ADRs. 132  Peter C. Reiss and Ingrid M. Werner 
different impressions of transaction costs, both on the same exchange (reading 
down  columns)  or between  exchanges  (reading  across  pairs  of  columns). 
SEAQ spread-related cost estimates range from 0.54 to 0.85 percent, a differ- 
ence of  El8 on the average trade. Nasdaq cost estimates range from 0.47  to 
0.7 1, a difference off  13.5. On both exchanges, the difference between the best 
bid and ask is clearly a weak upper bound on costs. The average discount from 
the best bid or ask on SEAQ is 0.07 percent, or roughly f4.4 on a median- 
size trade. 
Comparing spreads across exchanges, we find that Nasdaq has lower spread- 
related transaction costs. The best bid-ask statistics show that on a median-size 
SEAQ trade, Nasdaq traders save f8.2! The value-weighted  Nasdaq measures 
also show that large Nasdaq trades receive substantial discounts from quoted 
prices. When one excludes trades outside the best bid-ask and weights spreads 
by  value, however, it appears that there is no substantial difference between 
SEAQ and  Nasdaq. The distribution  of  trade  values  about the  best  bid-ask 
prices  provides  one  possible  explanation  for the  difference  narrowing.  Al- 
though  SEAQ has wider best  bid-ask  spreads, a larger percentage  of  large 
SEAQ trades go through inside the best bid-ask prices. The difference between 
the SEAQ value-weighted  and the unweighted effective spreads suggests that 
SEAQ transaction  costs fall substantially with the size of a trade. The differ- 
ence between the effective spreads of f5.3 roughly equals the commission on 
a f2,300 trade. 
Although the statistics in table 5.1 suggest that Cadbury traders receive bet- 
ter prices on Nasdaq, these average comparisons mask systematic differences 
in Nasdaq and SEAQ dealer discount policies. The middle section of table 5.1 
shows how the timing of trades affects the cost comparisons in the top section. 
It reports the percentage distribution of the best bid-ask spread by minutes the 
markets are open, number of trades, and trade value. On SEAQ, for example, 
26.3 percent of the time (two hours and six minutes of a trading day) a trader 
can expect to pay a four-pence  spread. Roughly one-fourth of  SEAQ trades 
and shares transact at this spread. On Nasdaq, however, the best bid-ask spread 
is around four pence 39 percent of the time, yet few trades or shares transact 
at this spread. There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. 
Nasdaq traders might be in a better position to trade when spread costs are low, 
or Nasdaq market makers might compete more for trades during high-volume 
periods. Our general point is that traditional comparisons of average transac- 
tion costs do not distinguish between these explanations. In what follows, we 
propose measures that isolate these differences better. 
Before developing our measures, we first describe features of Nasdaq and 
SEAQ that influence how we construct and interpret our measures. Figures 5.1 
and 5.2 display quotation and trading histories for Cadbury on two arbitrarily 
chosen days, October  16 and  17, 1991. These figures illustrate where trades 
occurs relative to the best bid and ask on SEAQ and Nasdaq. The solid lines 
are the best bid  and offer. London traders call this the “touch.” The dashed 133  Transaction Costs in Dealer Markets 
vertical lines mark the official open and close on Nasdaq and the unofficial 
open and close on SEAQ. (The appendix describes the SEAQ data and trading 
procedures in greater detail.) Figures 5.1A and 5.1B show the unique informa- 
tion we have on SEAQ trades. They display customer orders, interdealer trades, 
and crossing trades. Figures 5.1C and 5.1D display the Nasdaq data. Like most 
publicly available data, the Nasdaq data do not identify trade counterparties. 
Figures 5.1A and 5.1B show that the SEAQ touch does not vary much during 
the course of the trading day.  Most customer trades (dots and triangles) go 
through at the touch. By contrast, many dealer trades (circles and stars) execute 
within the touch. The figures also show that SEAQ market makers do not use 
a fixed tick-size rule when offering discounts. The black stars represent inter- 
dealer broker (IDB) trades executed on one of four anonymous electronic bul- 
letin boards. The four IDB systems provide services similar to those offered to 
Nasdaq dealers by Instinet. Generally, it appears that SEAQ trades are distrib- 
uted randomly throughout the day, and there are no obvious anomalies when 
Nasdaq opens. On both days, at least one customer sell order executes outside 
the touch. These trades seemingly violate SEAQ's best execution rule (see the 
appendix). 
During  this  period,  sixteen  SEAQ market  makers  and  over  twenty-five 
Nasdaq market makers posted quotes and took trades. Though not pictured, 
each SEAQ market maker had a quoted spread of five pence. That is, the differ- 
ence between their quoted bid and ask prices was five pence. Cadbury market 
makers  maintained  this  spread virtually  the  entire  year!6 Since the  market 
touch was four pence or less on these two days, no SEAQ market maker ever 
simultaneously posted at the best bid and best ask. Unfortunately, we do not 
have  similar information  for Nasdaq.  Other  studies,  however,  suggest  that 
Nasdaq market makers rarely post both the best bid and ask (see Chan, Chris- 
tie, and Schultz [1995]). 
Comparing  contemporaneous  touch  spreads,  we  see  that  SEAQ has  a 
slightly  larger spread on October  16  and a smaller one on the  17th. These 
differences are not large enough to cause arbitrage. Figure 5.2 provides infor- 
mation about the size of trades. In each panel, we have scaled the area of the 
circles to represent the number of  shares traded. This figure suggests that, in 
contrast to the NYSE, some but not nearly all large trades execute inside the 
touch. The IDB trades and broker trades are also larger than the average cus- 
tomer trade. Finally, the figure suggests that large interdealer trades usually, 
though not always, execute within the spread. 
5.2.2  Estimating Transaction Costs: Adjusted Apparent Spreads 
Table 5.1 and figures 5.1 and 5.2 together reveal substantial differences in 
transaction  spreads, The obvious challenge is to devise measures that isolate 
6.  There are a few instances when market makers posted wider spreads (seven, eight, and ten 
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Fig. 5.2  Trade sizes and best bid-ask, Cadbury Schweppes, 1991. London: A, 
October 16; B, October 17. Nasdaq: C, October 16; 0,  October 17. 
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these differences. Demsetz’s (1968) original work suggested one should inter- 
pret the quoted spread as a security dealer’s price for immediacy. In theory, the 
price of immediacy is the difference between an investor’s purchase or sales 
price and the asset’s “true” or “immediate” value. As Demsetz and others note, 
researchers  and  dealers  rarely  know  an  asset’s  true  value.  There is  little 
agreement among researchers, however, on how to define or measure immedi- 
ate value. The definition we adopt is the instantaneous cost of a round-trip 
transaction-what  we call the apparent cost or apparent spread incurred by 
simultaneously purchasing and selling shares. We adopt this definition because 
it follows Demsetz’s concept of immediacy and because it pairs the costs of 
comparable trades. The obvious practical problem with our definition is that 
one rarely observes comparable simultaneous buy and sell orders. To explain 
how we overcome this problem, we briefly summarize other approaches. 
Prior researchers have measured transaction costs by averaging best bid-ask 
spreads or by  inferring implicit spreads from neighboring transaction prices. 
Figure 5.3 illustrates several problems with these approaches. For simplicity, 
it presumes that the touch is constant. As in figure 5.2, the areas of the circles 
represent each trade’s size. The effective spread at time f - 1, 2 X E,-l,  mea- 
sures transaction costs as the deviation of price from the touch midpoint. This 
measure implicitly assumes that the midpoint is the asset’s “true value,” or that 
the discount on a reverse transaction would receive the same discount. Since 
on SEAQ the same dealer rarely posts both the best bid and ask, it is unclear 
why the touch midpoint is the best way to measure a SEAQ security’s true 
value. Indeed, the Cadbury data reveal that the average of dealers’ quotes can 
differ substantially from the touch midpoint. For instance, occasionally fifteen 
market makers will be at the ask and only one at the bid. Do these positions 
signal that the touch midpoint is not the “average” or true price? This question 
is difficult to answer. We would like in principle to have a measure of transac- 
tion costs that incorporates this information, since the positions of dealers may 
affect their willingness to offer discounts. 
Figure 5.3 also displays another popular measure of spread-related transac- 
tion costs, those based on differences in neighboring buy and sell transaction 
Ask 
t 
Touch Midpoint  Tt 
Et.l  {  O- - - - - -  - 
0 
A 
Y  Bid 
t-1  t  t+1 
0  Trade 
Tt  Touch at time t 
Et  One-half the Effective Spread 
Apt  Price Change from time t-1 to t 
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prices. At time t, AP, measures the difference between a small buy and a large 
sell order. This implicit spread measure has the advantage that it does not re- 
quire quotation information. The figure, however, reveals a potential drawback. 
Since it compares the discounts of different-size trades, it can mask size dis- 
counts. The same caveat applies to spread measures proposed by  Roll (1984) 
and others. These measures estimate spreads from serial covariances of trans- 
action price changes. Although subsequent research has refined Roll’s measure 
to allow for drifting spreads and dealer inventories, few studies condition these 
serial covariances on other observable trade characteristics, such as order size. 
Some studies also have used regression analysis to condition price changes on 
past price changes and trade characteristics.’ These regressions, however, usu- 
ally do not relate price changes to information about the touch or dealers’ 
quotes. 
Figure 5.4 illustrates how we propose to use trade characteristics and price 
information to develop a measure of transaction costs. The figure displays a 
sell order receiving a discount D, from the best quoted bid. We  define the ap- 
parent spread on this transaction, AS,, as the difference between the transaction 
price P, and the quoted ask. The apparent spread provides an upper bound on 
transaction costs because SEAQ’s best execution would guarantee a reverse 
purchase execution at or within the ask. An  obvious question is, why is the 
quoted ask the appropriate benchmark for the reverse (round-trip) transaction? 
Aside from SEAQ best execution rules, there is no guarantee that a market 
maker will execute the reverse buy order at the touch. 
Since we do not observe the reverse discount, we propose to estimate it. One 
possible estimate of what a market maker might offer is the discount D on the 
customer’s original sale. If  this discount is applied to the ask, we obtain the 
effective  spread. If  this  discount  is  applied  to  a  dealer’s  ask price  above 
the market ask, then we can obtain a price that is outside the touch. This assign- 
ment rule therefore can violate the exchange’s best execution rule. Since there 
is little reason to believe that the same dealer will execute the reverse transac- 
tion at the same discount, we propose an econometric model of discounts that 
uses past information to predict what dealers would offer under current condi- 
tions. Using this model, we construct an estimate of  the reverse transaction 
discount D and then define the round-trip transaction cost as the adjusted ap- 
parent spread, that is, the difference between the apparent spread and the esti- 
mated discount, or XS  = AS -  D. 
The key  element of  our approach is the econometric model that predicts 
discounts using trade information. Ideally, we should develop this model from 
a rich theory that predicts how dealers use information to set spreads and dis- 
counts. Formally, we would like to know the structure of D = D(SZ,), where a, 
7. Compare Ho and Macris (1984); Glosten (1987); Glosten and Hams (1988); Stoll (1989); 
Harris (1990); Madhavan and Smidt (1991); Hasbrouck (1991); Lee and Ready (1991); and Lee, 
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Fig. 5.4  Adjusted apparent spread 
represents the market maker’s information at the time of trade. Because we are 
unlikely to observe everything in R,, we must adopt an alternative model. We 
formulate a conditional prediction model by  assuming discounts are random 
draws from a density 
Here  f  represents the observed density function of discounts, and w, represents 
our information. By examining how the observed conditioning variables w, 
affectj we hope to identify what factors determine dealer discounts, and thus 
transaction costs. 
In principle, we would use a variety of statistical techniques to estimate how 
the conditioning variables w, affect  We  chose to use quantile regressions. 
These regressions describe how the quantiles (or percentiles) of D vary with w, 
(see Koenker and Basset [  19781). We  chose conditional quantiles over means 
primarily to minimize the influence of misclassified trades, a problem present 
in most intraday transaction data sets. To underscore the point that these quan- 
tile regressions do not produce “structural” estimates of parameters underlying 
D(R,), we  suppress the coefficients from the underlying regressions and in- 
stead report point predictions and approximate standard errors. To  the extent 
that we  have  statistical hypotheses, they are that particular variables do not 
explain observed discounts. In work not reported here, we have explored the 
robustness of our predictions using split-sample techniques. These checks con- 
vince us that the quantile estimates are reasonably accurate for all but very 
large trades. 
5.2.3 
To date, we have estimated very simple models of discounts and spreads. In 
future work, we plan to experiment with other conditioning variables, such as 
the direction of trades. The specifications we report here examine whether and 
how discounts vary with the trade counterparties (for SEAQ only), the size of 
trades, and the touch. While previous studies have examined the separate im- 
pact of the touch and the size of trades, our specifications allow for interactions 
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between the two. To our knowledge, we are the first to estimate counterparty 
effects. 
Since we do not use conditioning variables that would generate asymmetric 
discounts, we treat discounts symmetrically by modeling apparent spreads. We 
assume SEAQ apparent spreads (AS = Touch -  Discount) equal 
(2) 
3 
AS, = Touch -  Discountl = x[p,,  + p,,8  Touch] 
,=o 
X  (Trade Size)  + E,, 
where  i indexes types of  trades (IDB, customer,  market-maker,  and broker 
trades), the p’s  are unknown coefficients, and  E  is an unobserved  error. In 
words, the apparent spreads are a polynomial in trade  size and interactions 
with the touch at the time of the trade. We include touch interactions on the 
right-hand side to allow for the possibility that apparent spreads may depend 
on the (guaranteed) touch spread. The Nasdaq regressions have a similar struc- 
ture. They use quartic polynomials in trade size and do not have coefficients 
that depend on trade types. 
Figures 5.5A-5.5C  plot the estimated apparent spread quartiles by  size of 
trade, the touch, and trader identities. To simplify comparisons between SEAQ 
and Nasdaq, we have expressed the apparent spreads as a fraction of the pre- 
vailing touch. The vertical differences between the top horizontal curves and 
the horizontal axis equal the estimated apparent spread divided by the touch. 
The vertical differences between pairs of similarly shaped curves are the esti- 
mated adjusted apparent spreads, our measure of the cost of an instantaneous 
round-trip transaction. Figure 5.5A displays how the median cost for a SEAQ 
customer trade depends on the touch and the trade’s size. The vertical dashed 
lines mark the median Cadbury trade size (approximately &4,500)  and the 
largest trade Cadbury market makers must accept at their posted bid or ask 
prices (approximately &lOO,OOO). The median-size customer trade executes at 
the touch, no matter what the touch. As Cadbury’s touch widens from two to 
three  to four pence,  the median  large customer  trade  receives  deeper  and 
deeper discounts. At  four pence,  a  trade  larger  than  &1,000,000  receives 
roughly a 25 percent discount (one pence per share, or &2,600  total). These 
estimates confirm that only very large (usually institutional) trades are likely 
to receive discounts. Even these large trades, however, are not assured dis- 
counts. The graphs also show that trade discounts do not widen at the same 
rate as the touch. That is, when the touch widens by one pence, the total dis- 
count from the bid and the ask does not increase by one pence. This shows that 
market makers do not use discounts to maintain a constant pence spread. 
Figure 5.5B summarizes the variation in customer transaction costs holding 
the touch constant at three pence (the sample median). The three curves repre- 
sent the first, second (median), and third apparent spread quartiles. Vertical 
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spreads. Note that there is no interquartile difference in apparent spreads at or 
below the median trade size. In other words, nearly all small retail orders pay 
the quoted spread. This finding appears at odds with asymmetric information 
models that predict small uninformed trades will receive more favorable execu- 
tion. Upper-quartile customer trades appear to receive no discount up to the 
minimum  quote size of  &100,000.  Surprisingly,  beyond the minimum quote 
size the dispersion in discounts increases. Nearly 25 percent of customer trades 
larger than &400,000  receive at least 50 percent discount, implying the adjusted 
apparent spread is zero or negative. The infrequency of large trades, however, 
reduces the precision of our estimates. 
The frequency with which we observe trades of  a given type and size is a 
key determinant of the statistical precision of our estimates. Generally, we ob- 
serve many more small trades than we do large, and many more trades at three 
pence than we do at two or four pence. A plot of apparent spreads by trade size 
also reveals  that  market  makers tend  to  clump discounts  on  whole  pence, 
though the exchange does not have tick-size rules. To provide an indication of 
the precision of our point estimates across ranges of trade values, we calculated 
standard errors using Chamberlain’s (1993) suggested approximations. These 
estimated standards confirm that the (point) precision of our estimates in figure 
5.5B deteriorates as the size of the trade increases. At the median trade size, 
the standard deviation of  the median apparent spread to touch ratio is 0.02. 
Thus, at a touch of three pence, a 95 percent confidence interval for the median 
apparent spread is 2.79 to 2.91 pence. For transactions near &150,000,  the stan- 
dard deviation rises to 0.04, by E300,OOO it is 0.10, and by &400,000  it is 0.19. 
Thus, we do not estimate apparent spreads precisely beyond two to three times 
the minimum quote size (&lOO,OOO). 
Figure 5.5C shows the estimated distribution of spreads for Nasdaq, holding 
the touch constant at three pence. We estimate that more than 50 percent of 
Nasdaq  trades  execute  at the  touch  and  thus receive  no  discount.  Lower- 
quartile trades receive discounts at most sizes. The Nasdaq quartiles are more 
curved than SEAQ quartiles, with discounts of 50 percent effectively eliminat- 
ing the spread for trades over &150,000.  At larger sizes, the discount diminishes 
and then appears to increase. Since we observe few trades in this range, we do 
not attach much significance to this increase, For now, we tentatively conclude 
that Nasdaq and SEAQ market makers have roughly comparable discount pol- 
icies. 
Finally, figure 5.5D displays how the median spreads of IDB, market maker- 
to-market  maker, and dealer-to-dealer (or market maker) trades vary with a 
trade’s size. Our calculations assume the  touch is three pence.  Because the 
SEAQ data do not identify which of  the two SEAQ dealers initiates a trade, 
we classify dealer trades as buy (sell) orders based on whether the observed 
price is above (below) the touch midpoint. The vertical dashed line indicates 
the  minimum  quote  size. Each type  of  interdeal  trade  has  a  median  size 
roughly  equal to  the  minimum  quote  size. The median  market  maker-to- 145  Transaction Costs in Dealer Markets 
market maker trade below &40O,OOO pays the full spread. This is perhaps not 
too surprising, since dealers negotiate these trades over the phone and market 
makers cannot tell whether the order is for the market  maker or a customer. 
When market makers deal anonymously with each other using IDBs, however, 
they discount the spread by  about one-third, or one pence. This also is not 
surprising, since IDB users purchase for (sell from) their own account so that 
they can subsequently sell to (buy from) a customer. SEAQ brokers seem to 
grant market makers and other brokers deep discounts. This results from an 
exchange rule requiring that dealers, when acting as a principal in a trade, have 
to deal at better prices than the touch. The median broker discount reaches a 
maximum of more than one-third the touch, or one pence, for trades around 
E540,OOO. Curiously, we observe few broker trades compared to the number of 
market maker-to-market  maker trades. 
5.3  Intersecurity Variations in Quoted and Touch Spreads 
The Cadbury example suggests that transaction costs vary  systematically 
with trader identities and order sizes. This leads us to question whether the 
Cadbury example  is representative  of  SEAQ transaction  costs.  Ideally  we 
would like to answer this question by using quantile regressions to estimate 
which factors affect each  SEAQ security’s adjusted apparent  spread. These 
calculations would allow us to distinguish between security, security class, and 
exchange-specific variations in transaction costs. Unfortunately, our data and 
econometric methods currently do not allow us to analyze a large sample of 
SEAQ securities. The main  obstacle we face is the time required  to match 
separate transaction and quotation records. The exchange transaction records, 
for example, require extensive checking to identify IDB trades and to match 
“shape” trades (see the appendix). 
Although we continue to work toward a longer-term goal of matching all 
SEAQ quotation  and  transaction  data, this  paper examines  two  narrower 
SEAQ samples. This section analyzes the fourth quarter  1991 quotation re- 
cords of 1,887 U.K. and Irish equities. The main advantage of  this sample is 
its broad coverage. These securities accounted for over 95 percent  of  1991 
SEAQ trading volume. Its main drawback is it contains only quotation infor- 
mation. Consequently, we can make statements only about how quoted prices 
and volumes  vary across securities. Section 5.4 uses matched quotation and 
transaction  data on sixty  of these  securities to find whether customers  pay 
quoted spreads. 
The Cadbury  results  suggest  that  we  should  find differences  in  spreads 
across securities, if only because the size of trades and characteristics of traders 
will vary across securities. The main issue we address here is, are there other 
factors that may cause residual differences? We can think of several, including 
the inherent riskiness of securities, the amount of total trading volume, and the 
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Previous  studies  of  Nasdaq  spreads  have  found  significant  cross-section 
variation  in best bid-ask  spreads. Much  of  this  variation  appears related to 
trading volume, with spreads declining rapidly as share volume increases and 
dealer concentration decreases. Some researchers interpret these relations as 
evidence of the benefits of market-maker competition. That is, market makers 
compete harder when there are more market makers. Other researchers attri- 
bute the decline to the high cost of marketing low-volume equities. What is 
unclear is why dealers of low-volume stocks have high costs. Given the simi- 
larities in the SEAQ and Nasdaq quotation systems, we also might expect to 
see spreads on SEAQ securities fall as trading volume increases. Indeed, we 
do. This raises the issue, how should one interpret the rate at which spreads 
decline? Our answer is that the decline reveals the economies of  scale in mar- 
ket making. 
Several rules introduced by the LSE in the mideighties encourage market- 
maker competition on SEAQ. First, the exchange allows free entry into market 
making, provided market makers have adequate capital. Second, the exchange 
allows market makers to quit or add securities on short notice. Third, the major 
costs of making markets, the market makers’ time and capital, are largely fixed 
and not sunk costs. Together these conditions suggest that even market makers 
for  small-volume  stocks  face  substantial  (potential)  competition.  Provided 
there is some slope to the demand for any individual market maker’s services, 
this competition will result in a familiar monopolistic competition equilibrium: 
competitive entry will  make each market maker’s demand  curve tangent to 
their average dealing-cost curve. If trading volume in a stock increases, com- 
peting market makers will enter, and reestablish the tangency condition. After- 
ward, each market maker will operate at a higher volume and charge a lower 
spread (since average dealing costs decline with volume). Thus, in a monopo- 
listically  competitive dealer market, the fall in spreads with trading volume 
reveals the shape of market makers’ average dealing cost function and the ex- 
tent of  scale economies (see Bresnahan and Reiss [1991]). Also, this theory 
predicts that it is the number of actual and not potential competitors that best 
predicts the decline in spreads. For example, if the number of market makers 
that could potentially make a market increases from two to ten, we would see 
no change in spreads. Whereas, if the ten entered, we would see a decrease 
in spreads. 
Table 5.2 and figure 5.6  report how the distribution of  quoted spreads and 
best  bid-ask  spreads  vary  across  the  1,887 SEAQ equities.  We  condition 
spreads on the number of market makers posting quotes, as opposed to the 
number of market makers eligible to post quotes. We note again that this condi- 
tioning does not have a causal interpretation. Instead, we base this conditioning 
on the monopolistic competition prediction that securities with little trading 
volume will have few dealers, and that each of these dealers will have higher 
costs. The spreads underlying the table and figure are quarterly medians of 
average daily spreads. We calculated a security’s average daily spread by aver- Table 5.2  SEAQ Quote Statistics by Number of Market Makers 
Quoted Spread  Touch Spread 
(9% of price)  (% of price)  Median Cost for  Median Number of Market  Median Number Of 
Quartiles  Quartiles  1,000-Share  Makers at  Quote Postings"  Median-Minimum 
Number of  Number of  Trade at Touch"  per Day and  Quote Size 


















22  6.19  14.84  28.57  6.19  14.83  28.57  57.28 
551  5.18  9.01  15.38  4.65  8.02  13.95  29.97 
454  3.76  6.47  11.11  3.12  5.25  9.17  23.82 
355  3.11  5.51  10.75  2.43  4.31  8.45  19.40 
211  1.68  4.05  7.48  2.32  2.79  5.15  15.55 
158  2.01  2.76  4.50  1.38  2.02  3.70  16.27 
89  1.95  2.68  4.60  1.37  1.91  3.39  19.95 
43  1.68  2.52  3.54  1.22  1.77  2.53  21.04 
34  1.68  2.04  3.32  1.04  1.57  2.31  20.42 
25  1.40  1.82  3.29  0.97  1.44  2.48  14.77 
22  1.53  2.51  3.74  1.10  1.65  2.40  20.17 
30  1.28  1.75  3.31  0.91  1.16  2.13  20.02 
59  1.31  1.57  2.29  0.88  1.29  1.61  19.83 
66  1.28  1.60  2.33  0.79  1.13  1.67  15.54 
53  1.35  1.59  2.31  0.74  1.12  1.65  14.93 
20  1.26  1.43  1.99  0.69  0.90  1.23  13.69 
7  0.95  1.30  1.53  0.69  0.79  0.91  15.01 
1.00  1.00 
2.00  2.00 
2.00  2.00 
2.74  2.69 
2.96  2.89 
3.06  3.00 
3.13  3.21 
4.01  3.92 
4.49  4.03 
5.39  5.14 
4.98  4.69 
4.14  4.30 
6.57  5.69 
6.20  5.27 
5.04  4.71 
4.85  4.92 




















































Notes; Based on 1,887 U.K.  and Irish equities with more than twenty days of  trading activity during the period October 14-December  27, 1991. The number of 
sample observations exceeds 1,887 because some securities experienced changes in the number of  market makers during the sample period. The underlying data are 
daily averages (8:30 A.M. to 4:30 P.M.)  of  minute-to-minute quotation histories. Quantiles are computed by  calculating medians across days by security and across 
market-maker concentrations. 
'The  median cost for trade at the touch is estimated as the difference between the touch and the touch midpoint times the value of  a thousand-share trade. 
"Number of quote postings = 1  .O means that one quote was posted at the start of trading and was not changed during the day. %  200j  :,, 
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Fig. 5.6  Spread quartiles by number of market makers for 1,887 SEAQ 
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aging minute-to-minute spreads during the quotation period: 8:30 A.M. to 4:30 
P.M. To summarize the  variation  in these median  spreads given a particular 
number  of  quoting  market  makers  (i.e.,  market  structure),  we  report  the 
quartiles of  these medians. Thus, the median of the median touch spreads of 
monopoly dealers is  14.83 percent of price. The median touch spread in the 
highest six monopoly markets is greater than 28.57 percent of price, and so 
on. Table 5.2 shows that the difference in the median touch spreads for markets 
with one versus five market makers is 12 percent of  price. The interquartile 
range for five market makers is only 2 percent of price. This large drop sug- 
gests there are scale economies at small volumes, and that low-volume dealers 
have excess capacity. The median minimum quote sizes in the far right column, 
which are based on the past twelve months’ trading volume, confirm that cus- 
tomer  transaction  costs,  as  measured  by  touch  spreads,  fall  with  trading 
volume . 
Figure 5.6A graphically displays how quickly the interquartile range and 
medians of  quoted spreads fall as market concentration decreases and share 
volume increases. Figure 5.6B does the same for touch spreads. The figures 
and table suggest that dealers achieve most scale economies in markets with 
minimum quote sizes of &15,000  to E25,000, which roughly corresponds to a 
market with five to eight dealers. Table 5.2 provides  additional evidence. It 
shows that the median cost of a thousand-share  trade executed at the touch 
falls from E57.28 when trading with a monopolist to around El6420 when 
trading with a dealer with four to seven competitors. The quoted spreads of the 
largest stocks in our sample, the FTSE- 100 equities, exhibit little interquartile 
dispersion, conditional or unconditional on the number of market makers. A 
monopolistic competition model would predict that these dealers are near the 
bottom  of  their  average dealing-cost  curves,  which roughly  corresponds  to 
minimum quote sizes of E50,OOO to &75,000.  Based on the exchange’s rule for 
calculating minimum quote sizes, this corresponds to an annual trading volume 
of between E500 and E700 million. 
The figure and table 5.2 reveal other interesting regularities. Touch spreads 
fall at roughly the same rate as quoted spreads. In percentage terms, the gap 
between the two widens as the number of market makers increases. This per- 
haps suggests that market makers allow themselves more leeway in moving 
quotes when they face greater competition. The relation is still somewhat odd, 
since  there  is  no obvious  reason  why  quoted  (as  opposed  to equilibrium 
spreads) should change with the number of competitors. Table 5.2 also reveals 
how dealers’ posting behavior may affect the difference between quoted and 
touch spreads. Columns ten through twelve of table 5.2 show that market mak- 
ers are usually either at the best bid, best ask, or setting quotes outside the 
market. For instance, the median security with nine market makers will have 
four market makers at the best bid and four at the best ask. The gap between 
the touch and quoted spread suggests the four dealers setting the best ask are 
not the same four setting the best bid. The remaining market maker straddles 150  Peter C. Reiss and Ingrid M. Werner 
both the best bid and ask. By doing so, this market maker avoids most of  the 
inventory and information risks associated with unsolicited trades. 
The second to last column of table 5.2 reports the median number of times 
per day a market maker changes its price quotes. Although we  know of  no 
obvious benchmark for this number, we were struck by how infrequently mar- 
ket makers adjust their stated willingness to take trades. One might attribute 
constant quoted prices to infrequent turnover, yet even FTSE-100 market mak- 
ers change their quotes less than once per hour! One explanation for these 
persistent prices is that the large minimum quote sizes substantially increase 
market makers’ capital risk. This risk causes them to widen spreads. By fixing 
wide spreads, they retain the option to vary transaction prices without changing 
quotes. We  now consider how frequently they offer discounts from the touch 
spread. 
5.4  Further Evidence on Apparent Spreads 
The analyses in sections 5.2 and 5.3 reveal substantial variation in spreads 
by  security, trader, time, and trade size. This section estimates an econometric 
model that isolates the contribution of these factors to apparent spreads. Our 
data sample consists of fourth-quarter 199  1 quotation and transaction histories 
for sixty SEAQ securities. We randomly chose the sixty securities so that they 
would equally represent large (i.e., FTSE- loo), medium, and small capitaliza- 
tion SEAQ securities. We limited the sample to sixty securities because of the 
time required to match and check quotation and trade data. The fourth quarter 
is the most recent we have (see the appendix). 
The three market capitalization classes roughly divide the sixty securities 
into three volume, market-structure, and price-size classes. Tables 5.3 and 5A. 1 
provide information on these classes and the  sample securities. Comparing 
tables 5.2 and 5.3, it appears that the sample represents the range of  SEAQ 
dealer concentration and trading volumes. During the mandatory quotation pe- 
riod, the FTSE-100 securities averaged 106 trades per day, totaling 27,156,000, 
compared to  13 trades totaling 2646,000 for medium equities and 5 trades 
totaling 283,000 for smaller equities. The average number of market makers 
ranges from 12.6 for FTSE-100 equities, to 6.2 and 4.7 for medium and small 
equities. The quoted and touch spread statistics in table 5.3 also span those in 
table 5.2. 
Table 5.3 provides median quoted, touch, effective, and adjusted apparent 
spreads for each security. Although these medians mask intrasecurity variation 
in transaction costs, they reveal considerable variation in spreads within and 
across size classes. Most of  this intersecurity variation occurs because these 
securities have different security prices, and not because they have different 
pence spreads. For instance, Cadbury Schweppes (CBRY) has median touch, 
apparent, and effective spreads of three pence. So does Abbey National (ANL). 
The percentage differences in  table 5.3 occur because Abbey’s price is two- Table 5.3  SEAQ Median Spreads as a Percentage of Average Trade Price 
RSE-I00 Size Class  Medium-Size Class  Smaller-Size Class 
Adjusted  Adjusted  Adjusted 
Security  Apparent  Touch  Effective  Quoted  Security  Apparent  Touch  Effective  Quoted  Security  Apparent  Touch  Effective  Quoted 






















0.56  0.56  0.56  0.83 
0.67  0.67  0.67  1.17 
0.70  0.70  0.70  1.05 
0.77  0.77  0.77  1.35 
0.78  1.05  0.78  1.31 
1.08  1.08  1.08  1.43 
0.96  0.96  0.96  1.28 
0.73  0.73  0.73  1.22 
0.68  0.68  0.68  1.13 
0.94  1.08  0.81  1.34 
0.67  0.67  0.67  1.12 
0.78  0.78  0.78  1.30 
1.53  1.53  1.53  2.29 
1.48  1.77  1.18  2.37 
0.93  1.31  0.93  1.87 
1.13  1.50  1.13  1.88 
0.80  0.80  0.80  1.33 
0.85  1.14  0.85  1.42 
0.55  0.55  0.55  0.92 
1.36  1.36  1.36  2.27 





















1.05  1.26 
1.24  1.24 
1.07  1.29 
2.87  3.44 
4.59  4.59 
1.21  1.38 
1.19  1.79 
1.01  1.42 
1.12  1.12 
0.76  1.02 
1.13  1.51 
8.95  8.95 
1.21  1.62 
1.87  2.49 
2.29  2.29 
2.40  2.40 
1.61  2.14 
11.99  11.99 
1.60  1.60 
2.48  3.47 
1.31  1.75 
0.84  1.69 
1.24  1.55 
1.07  2.15 
2.29  4.59 
4.59  7.64 
1.21  1.73 
1.19  2.39 
1.01  1.42 
1.12  1.56 
0.8 1  1.27 
1.13  1.89 
8.95  13.43 
1.21  2.02 
1.87  3.1 1 
2.29  3.06 
2.40  3.20 
1.61  2.68 
8.99  14.99 
1.60  2.13 
2.48  4.96 









































































































Source: Data were drawn from the LSE’s computer records for the period October 14-December  27, 1991. 152  Peter C. Reiss and Ingrid M. Werner 
thirds Cadbury’s price. Although on other exchanges the fixed spread might 
occur because of tick-size rules, the LSE does not regulate tick sizes. Thus, it 
is puzzling that absolute SEAQ spreads do not vary more with price. We  also 
observe that the variation here is similar, though perhaps more substantial, than 
that reported for Nasdaq firms by  Stoll(l989). He reports spreads for Nasdaq/ 
National Market System stock size deciles. They range from 1.2 to 6.9 percent 
of  price.  A  recent  study  by  Chan,  Christie,  and  Schultz  (1995) using  a 
more recent time period reports higher average percentage spreads for large 
Nasdaq stocks.’ 
The within-class variation in  spreads and discounts in table 5.3 does not 
appear related to dealer concentration or volume. Compare, for example, the 
two oil companies, Richmond Oil and Gas (ROG) and Crossroads Oil (COI). 
They have the same touch and the same number of market makers. Richmond, 
however, has a much greater median discount. The greater discount granted 
the median Richmond trade may reflect Richmond’s larger average trade size. 
Yet, if trade size explains this difference, then why do we not observe greater 
differences between Richmond and other securities? 
As suggested by the analyses in sections 5.2 and 5.3, the interclass differ- 
ences in spreads might reflect differences in trade counterparties and the vol- 
ume of trade. Table 5.4 reports information on the distribution of trade counter- 
parties and trade sizes for each of the three size classes. Most trades in each 
class are “customer bargains,” that is, trades where a retail customer is a coun- 
terparty. Market makers execute between 60 and 75 percent of  these trades. 
This is somewhat surprising, since the exchange has more than three hundred 
brokers and just  twenty-seven market makers. When brokers do trade with 
customers, they typically execute large transactions. Relative to other trades, 
we rarely observe agency crosses, or customer-to-customer trades. Curiously, 
these trades occur more frequently among smaller (less liquid) issues. The av- 
erage FTSE-100 equity has 106 customer trades per day, which vastly exceeds 
the number of  customer trades for medium (13) and small (5) equities. Al- 
though the number of trades per day differs substantially, the average and me- 
dian trade sizes do  Thus, this table suggests that average trade sizes alone 
do not explain differences in median spreads. 
The next section of  table 5.4 examines whether interdealer trade discounts 
differ. If particular types of interdealer trades receive large discounts, then we 
might expect this to affect average spreads. As a group, the FTSE-100 sample 
equities have considerably more interdealer trades than either the medium or 
small equities. Table  5.3, however,  shows that  the smaller equities receive 
greater percentage discounts. Thus, the total volume of interdealer trades does 
8. Several studies report lower spreads for NYSE stocks. For instance, Kleidon and Werner 
9. Median trade sizes (not reported in  table 5.4) are FTSE-100 f3.744,  medium-size f4,550, 
(1993) report an average quoted spread of 0.6 percent for S&P 100  stocks in 1991. 
and small equities f2,625. Table 5.4  SEAQ Trading Volume by Type of Trade 
FEE-I00 Size Class  Medium-Size Class  Small-Size Class 
Average Trade  Average Trade  Avcrage Trade 
Type of Trade  Trades  (’% of  total)  (1,000 pounds)  Trades  (% of  total)  (I  ,OOO  pounds)  Trades  (% of total)  ( 1,000  pounds) 
Number of  Pound-Volume  Size  Number of  Pound-Volume  Size  Number of  Pound-Volume  Size 
Customer trades 
MM sells to customer 
Customer sells to MM 
Dealer sells to 
customer 
Customer sells to 
dealer 




MM sells to MM 
IDB trades 
MM sells to dealer 
Dealer sells to MM 
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Source: Data were drawn from the LSE’s computer records for the period October 14-December 27, 199  I. 
Notes: The number of trades is cumulative for the entire sample period and includes all firms in each group. IDB = interdealer broker; MM  = market maker. 154  Peter C. Reiss and Ingrid M. Werner 
not obviously appear related to discounts. Table 5.4, however, also shows that 
the four IDB systems account for an appreciable fraction of total interdealer 
trades. This suggests that market makers can take advantage of discounts of- 
fered on electronic systems that are not offered over the phone. Together, these 
results suggest that, while differences in the mix of customer and interdealer 
trades can explain some variation in spreads and discounts, they are not the 
only sources of variation. 
Table 5.5 describes how median apparent spreads and discounts differ with 
trade counterparties. To facilitate comparison, it contains apparent spreads and 
discounts expressed  as fractions of  the  prevailing  touch.  No adjustment  is 
made for differences in the size of trades or trading volume. As in the Cadbury 
example, the median trade between a customer and a market maker receives 
no discount. The median customer trade through a broker does receive a dis- 
count.  These discounts are small for FTSE-100  securities  and  large  (one- 
quarter to one-third of the touch) for medium- and small-size class securities. 
Customer crosses receive large discounts. This is not too surprising, since these 
trades usually involve large institutions swapping equity “baskets.” Median in- 
terdealer trades receive modest discounts, more so in the medium and smaller 
equity size classes. Most IDB trades and trades between dealers occur at or 
close to touch midpoints.’” Infrequent dealer crosses usually occur at one-half 
the touch. The table also shows that asymmetries exist. For example, the me- 
dian discount on a medium-class customer buy from a dealer is 25 percent of 
the touch. The corresponding  discount for a customer sell is 8 percent. This 
asymmetry reinforces our earlier point that dealer discounts may have little to 
do with the touch midpoint. 
Following the Cadbury Schweppes analysis, we can use quantile regressions 
to decompose apparent spreads for these sixty securities into volume, trader, 
and security-specific components. In principle, we could proceed by estimat- 
ing separate regressions for each security. In practice, this approach is compu- 
tationally and descriptively unwieldy. We  instead estimated  separate models 
for each size class. These specifications include security fixed effects. Addi- 
tionally, because  spreads differ across  securities  in relation to the security’s 
price, we scaled the apparent and touch spreads by security prices. Experimen- 
tation with functional forms led us to the following  specification describing 
customer trades for security j: 
(3) 
AS  Touch 
9  P” + -p, 
--I= 
+ i  I=  I  [P‘ + 
10. The negative  adjusted  apparent 
spreads and discounts. 
spreads  occur because we  separately  estimate median Table 5.5  SEAQ Median Apparent Spreads and Discounts by Type of Trade (percentage of touch) 
FTSE-100  Size Class  Medium-Size Class  Smaller-Size Class 
Adjusted  Adjusted  Adjusted 
Apparent  Apparent  Apparent 
'Qpe of Trade  Apparent Spread  Discount  Spread  Apparent Spread  Discount  Spread  Apparent Spread  Discount  Spread 
Customer trades 
MM sells to customer  1  .oo  0.00  1  .00  1 .oo  0.00  1  .oo  1  .oo  0.00  1  .00 
Customer sells to MM  1  .oo  0.00  I .oo  1  .00  0.00  1  .oo  1  .00  0.00  I .00 
Dealer sells to customer  1 .oo  0.02  0.98  0.75  0.08  0.67  0.75  0.00  0.75 
Customer sells to dealer  0.98  0.00  0.98  0.92  0.25  0.67  1  .OO  0.25  0.75 
Customer sells to customer  0.75  0.25  0.50  0.60  0.40  0.20  0.75  0.25  0.50 
MM sells to MM  1 .00  0.00  1 .00  1  .00  0.00  I .oo  1  .00  0.00  1  .OO 
IDB  trades  0.50  0.50  0.00  0.42  0.58  -0.16  0.50  0.50  0.00 
MM sells to dealer  0.50  0.50  0.00  0.58  0.67  -0.09  0.64  0.50  0.14 
Dealer sells to MM  0.50  0.50  0.00  0.33  0.42  -0.09  0.50  0.36  0.14 
Dealer sells to dealer  0.75  0.25  0.50  0.73  0.27  0.46  NA  NA  NA 
Interdealer trades 
Median touch spread  3 pence  4 pence  2 pence 
Source; Data were drawn from the LSE's computer records for the period October 14-December 27, 1991 
Notes: Reported numbers are medians across trades for all securities in each group. ZDB  = interdealer broker; MM = market maker. 156  Peter C. Reiss and Ingrid M. Werner 
In  words,  we represent  the  conditional  quantiles  of  apparent  spreads  as  a 
quartic in the trade’s pound value interacted with the touch and the square of 
the touch. The coefficient  Po is the apparent  spread when the touch is zero. 
The coefficient 0,  is a security-specific fixed effect that captures differences in 
discounts  from the  touch  across  securities.  The polynomial  in  size and the 
squared touch give added flexibility  to the shape of  the conditional  median 
discount function. To capture differences in customer and noncustomer trades, 
we included additional  zero-one dummy variables interacted  with  the touch 
and the touch squared when the trade involved an IDB, a dealer, or two mar- 
ket makers. 
Table 5.6 summarizes the results of the conditional median regressions for 
each size class. The first panel describes the fit. While there is no natural mea- 
sure of  fit, the average absolute error is small, and the conditional  medians 
explain about 60 percent of the variation in apparent spreads (over price). Fig- 
ure 5.7 plots actual versus fitted values for the medium-size class. It shows that 
the model does reasonably well explaining the substantial variation in apparent 
spreads. The security-specific fixed effects explain little of the variation in ap- 
parent spreads. In future work, we plan to investigate whether there are more 
complicated security-specific size and trader effects. The other three panels in 
table 5.6 suggest that the model explains a large fraction of the variation across 
securities, but also that there are exceptions. The interquartile range statistics 
(columns 3 and 6) show that trade size, touch, and trade type explain variation 
in apparent spreads. The large absolute errors and standard deviations show, 
however, that there are outlying spreads the model does not explain. We do not 
have an explanation for these unusual spreads, although most occur because of 
trades outside the quoted spread. These observations may represent match or 
coding errors. 
Figures 5.8A-5.8C  display estimated conditional median apparent spreads 
for customer trades by  size class. The vertical  distance  between  the upper 
curves and the horizontal axis is the estimated apparent spread. As in the Cad- 
bury example, the vertical distance between similar curves equals the adjusted 
apparent spread. Each median is evaluated at the average of the firm effects. 
Figure 5.8A plots median adjusted apparent spreads for FTSE-100 equities as 
the touch ranges from 0.5  to 1.5 percent of price. These estimates are similar 
to those for Cadbury. Medium and large trades (E75,OOO-E500,OOO)  receive 
only slight discounts when the touch is 0.5 percent of price. As the touch wid- 
ens, the median FTSE-100 trade obtains a greater discount. 
Figures 5.8B and 5.8C repeat the format of  figure 5.8A for medium- and 
small-size equities. The sample average touches are 1.3  percent of price for the 
medium-size class and 2.3 percent of price for the small class. For the medium- 
size class, median spreads fall monotonically as the size of the trade increases. 
The same is true for the small-size class, but the decline is less pronounced. 
For instance, when the touch is  1 percent of price, trades greater than E4,500 









Apparent spreadtransaction price mean (%) 
Apparent spread/transaction price median (%) 
Apparent spreadtransaction price standard deviation (76) 
Quantile standard error 
Average error 


























Standard Deviation  Interquartile Range  Quantile Regression  (I -  2) 
Median AS/P  of  ASP  of ASP  Average Absolute Error  Standard Deviation  Interquartile Range  x=(5)/(2) 






































FTSE-100  Size Class 
0.28  0.05 
0.41  0.10 
0.19  0.07 
0.75  0.09 
0.43  0.11 
0.36  0.04 
0.40  0.18 
0.29  0.09 
0.38  0.09 
0.36  0.14 
0.42  0.14 


































0.3  I 
0.30 
0.46 Table 5.6  (continued) 
Regression Error 
Standard Deviation  Interquartile Range  Quantile Regression  (I ~  2) 
Median ASP  of ASP  of ASP  Average Absolute Error  Standard Deviation  Interquartile Range  x=(5)/(2) 
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0.3  I 
0.68 
0.53  0.24 
2.78  0.44 
0.01  0.66 
0.47  0.5  1 
0.85  0.35 
1.25  0.29 
0.46  0.59 
2.07  0.56 
0.56  0.60 
0.00  0.91 
0.00  0.16 
1.17  0.28 
1.23  0.55 
0.91  0.47 
0.01  0.28 
2.45  0.05 
0.3  I  0.29 
3.74  0.30 
0.52  0.69 
I .62  0.88 
0.5 I  0.84 
0.75  0.59 
0.22  0.95 
0.02  0.83 
Note: The median apparent spreads in table 6.5 differ because they are median spreads divided by average price. 160  Peter C. Reiss and Ingrid M. Werner 
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Fig. 5.7  Apparent spread by log(trade size) for a medium size class sample, 
fourth quarter 1991. Actual apparent spread versus median predicted apparent 
spread. 
Nore: AS = apparent spread. 
ratio is at the low end of  medium- and small-size class spreads. The median 
FTSE-100 trade receives a larger discount the wider the touch, although for 
the very largest trades (not pictured) there is evidence that such discounts dis- 
appear. These differences in discounts across size classes suggest that large 
orders  have  either  very  different  competitive  consequences  or  cost conse- 
quences for market makers. 
Figure 5.8D shows the estimated  apparent  spreads granted by  dealers of 
FTSE-100 securities, holding the touch constant at 1 percent of price. Again, 
these results parallel those in the Cadbury example. Dealer trades have a profile 
similar to customer discounts, though the discount levels differ. Market makers 
do not discount the median trade. Brokers discount the spread by  one-third 
when dealing with each other, and IDB trades execute at roughly  the touch 
midpoint. Translated into adjusted apparent spreads and not adjusting for the 
direction of trades, this corresponds to a one-third broker-to-broker spread and 
no IDB spread. 
5.5  Conclusions 
This study used unique SEAQ transaction and quotation data to document 
SEAQ spreads and market-maker discounts. To the best of our knowledge, this 161  Transaction Costs in Dealer Markets 
is the first study to account simultaneously for differences by type of trade, 
trade volume,  and security. We began by  first developing a new measure of 
transaction costs, the adjusted  apparent spread. This measure calculates the 
hypothetical cost of  an (immediate) round-trip transaction using information 
on dealers’ quotes and investors’ transactions. Specifically, we used quantile 
regressions to model how these spreads varied with trade, trader, and security 
characteristics. Our estimates reveal that medium to large trades on average 
receive discounts from the touch spread. These discounts increase, the wider 
the touch. Small and very large trades pay the touch (and sometimes more). 
Dealers and market makers price customer trades differently. Market makers 
discount only very large trades; dealers regularly  discount medium and large 
trades. Market makers rarely discount trades with other market makers over 
the phone, but do so when trading anonymously using IDBs. 
The practice of discounting the touch raises many fascinating questions that 
need further study. We would like to develop theoretical models that explain 
why dealers grant discounts and how discounts affect spreads. We also would 
like to understand why dealers link these discounts to size. The pattern  we 
observe suggests that neither simple asymmetric information nor inventory risk 
models can easily explain why dealers widen spreads and then selectively dis- 
count. The anonymous role of IDBs in interdealer trades also deserves further 
study. Finally, it would be useful to develop a monopolistic competition model 
of  market  making that recognizes  how  market makers  spread  their dealing 
costs across securities. 
Our empirical analysis is preliminary  and leaves many issues untouched or 
partially addressed. We clearly should estimate adjusted apparent spreads us- 
ing information about who originates trades. We also need to extend the data 
samples to explore whether dealers individually have different discount poli- 
cies. Other market-maker information also should enter our regressions. For 
instance, although we condition on the touch at the time of trade, we do not 
control for market depth at the bid and the ask, or past information. Additional 
variables might include market indexes, and capital or price risk measures. 
Finally, our findings suggest that researchers should not use average spreads 
to measure the efficiency of a market. Instead, one should compare measures 
that hold constant characteristics that market makers “price.” While our re- 
search does not provide an analytical understanding of how dealers decide on 
quoted and transaction prices, it provides a place to begin. 
Appendix 
Quotation and Transaction Data 
The Cadbury Schweppes Nasdaq transaction data come from the Institute 
for the Study of  Security Markets.  On Nasdaq, Cadbury  Schweppes  shares 0.6 Pmt  of Price 
1.0Pmt  ofPrice 
1.6 Percent of Price 
L6 
LO 
hnmlt of Price 
Pement of Price 
06  rkrcerlt of  Price 
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00  05  10  15  20  25  30  5s  40  IS  50 
Log(ltade Si  in  Pounds (OOO)) 
Fig. 5.8  Apparent spread by log(trade size) and touch, fourth quarter 1991. 
Customer trades, median apparent spreadkouch:  A, FTSE-100 size class sample; B, 
medium-size class sample; C,  small-size class sample. Dealer trade median AS/ 
touch: 0,  FTSE-100 size class sample. 
Notes; AS = apparent spread; IDB = interdealer broker; MM  market maker. MMtoMM- 
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trade as ADRs. We converted  the Nasdaq shares to pound-equivalent shares 
using daily FT-Actuaries foreign exchange rates quoted in London. 
The SEAQ data come from the Quality of Markets Group at the LSE. Both 
the SEAQ transactions and quotations data required extensive editing to match 
samples and dealer codes. For the Cadbury analysis, we use all overlapping 
trade and quotation data. These data cover January 14 to March  18, April 2 to 
June 24, July I to September 24, and October 14 to December 3 1. In sections 
5.3 and 5.4 we use October 14 to December 3 1. The quotation data cover two 
thousand U.K. and Irish ordinary shares. Some securities are missing data be- 
cause of retrieval problems, new listings, delistings, or trading halts.  SEAQ 
rules require market makers to quote guaranteed prices and volumes between 
8:30 A.M. and 4:30 P.M. London time. Dealers sometimes post prices for up to 
one-half hour before the mandatory open and close. These quotes are not bind- 
ing. During the mandatory quote period, market makers must accept trades as 
large as 2.5 percent of the security’s previous  twelve months’ average daily 
trading volume. Dealers must also offer “best execution.” During  1991, this 
meant SEAQ market makers had to execute trades at less than the minimum 
quote size or inside the prevailing touch. Market makers away from the touch 
had  to execute orders  at the touch price (or better) or transfer the  order to 
another market maker. 
We obtained transaction data for 907 larger U.K. and Irish securities. Ap- 
proximately 840 of these equities appear in the quotation sample. The transac- 
tion  data  come from  end-of-day  settlement  reports  filed  with  the  Central 
Checking Section of the LSE. These reports do not necessarily reproduce the 
original ticker tape. Each trade has two time stamps, one reported by the seller 
and one by the buyer. We use the seller’s time stamp unless it indicates a trade 
outside the prevailing touch. If the seller’s time stamp would classify the trade 
as outside the touch, we check the buyer’s time stamp. If the buyer’s time stamp 
puts the trade at or within the touch, we use the buyer’s time. If  neither time 
stamp appears valid, we use the seller’s time. This reduces the number of trades 
that execute outside the touch, but does not eliminate them. Trades outside the 
touch are sometimes “average price” basket trades. Dealers execute baskets 
using prearranged pricing formulas. The data also contain coding anomalies. 
The most significant are “shapes.” Shapes occur when a dealer matches several 
customer orders with one (sometimes two) other customer order(s). These ap- 
pear in the data as a series of unbalanced customer transactions. 
Pilot Sample with Quotes and Transactions 
We constructed the sample of sixty securities by randomly sampling names 
from a list of  all SEAQ equities. We  first assigned securities on this list to 
market capitalization classes based on their March 3  1, 1991, market capitaliza- 
tion.” We then randomly sampled within classes, rejecting any security lacking 
11. Quality of Markets Companies Book 1991 (London: London Stock Exchange, I99  1 ),  table 
I, “1000 largest listed UK companies by market valuation,” 19-38. 165  Transaction Costs in Dealer Markets 
complete data. We also required that it have a minimum quote size of at least 
two thousand shares and more than seven hundred trades between March 31, 
1990, and March 31, 1991. We chose the twenty FTSE-100 firms so that they 
would overlap with previous LSE studies. 
Table 5A.  1 provides additional information on the sixty firms. 
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Market  Median  Normal Market  Transactions  Number of 
Capitalization  Average Price  Trade Size  Size  in Mandatory  Market 




























Sun Alliance Group 
Cadbury Schweppes 
Whitbread 
Legal & General 
Associated British Foods 
United Biscuits Holdings 
Rolls-Royce 
Royal Bank of  Scotland 
RMC Group 
Willis Corroon 




FTSE-100  Firms 
20,882  3.60 
8,062  5.99 
6,432  2.85 
5,530  5.20 
4,171  3.83 
3,564  2.79 
3,002  3.13 
2,681  4.11 
2,298  4.41 
2,242  3.72 
2,121  4.48 
1,752  3.84 
1,557  1.31 
1,440  I .69 
1,348  5.35 
1,084  2.66 
1,147  3.76 
1,061  3.52 
965  5.44 
884  2.20 

























































































































Lovell (Y.J.)  Holdings 
Thorntons 


















































































813  9 
1,907  5 
1,978  6 
614  I 
2,839  11 
203  6 
454  7 
305  7 
300  6 
250  5 
454  6 
618  7 
148  5 
454  6 
306  4 
114  4 
359  6 
895  4 
532  5 
525  7 
Average  255  2.41  9,799  13,539  103  6.2 


































































































































































Average  48  0.70  3,419  4,057  258  4.7 
Sources: Market capitalization on March 31, 1991, as reported in Qua&  of  Markets Companies Book 1991 (London: London Stock 
Exchange, 1991), table 3. Transactions data were drawn from the LSE computer records for the period October 14-December 27, 1991. 
The average price is calculated based on all trades during the sample that took place during the mandatory quote period. The median 
trade size is based on the pound value of all trades during the mandatory quote period for the sample. Normal market sizes in number 
of  shares are from the computer records of the LSE. The pound value of the normal  market sizes are the number of shares times the 
average price of transactions. 169  Transaction Costs in Dealer Markets 
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Comment  F.  Douglas Foster 
The paper by  Reiss and Werner provides  an interesting introduction to price 
formation and trading costs on the London Stock Exchange (LSE).  The authors 
appear to be less interested in testing a specific set of hypotheses. Rather, their 
paper provides  a thorough overview of the LSE, with a particular interest in 
how trading costs in this market can be measured, and how these costs compare 
with  other  exchanges (in  particular  with  the  Nasdaq  market  in  the  United 
F, Douglas Foster is associate professor of  finance at the College of Business Administration at 
the University of Iowa. 170  Peter C. Reiss and Ingrid M. Werner 
States). The authors demonstrate that (1) bid-ask quotes on the LSE are rela- 
tively large and rarely change. Competition in this market is related, in part, to 
discounts from the quoted bid-ask spread; and (2) different classes of investors 
(customers, market makers, brokers, and interdealer broker [IDB] trades) ap- 
pear to be offered different discounts from the best bid and ask (the touch). 
Because of  these effects, simply using the quoted bid-ask spread to measure 
trading costs can be very misleading. Reiss and Werner provides us with a very 
carefully constructed analysis of trading data that describes this problem, with 
particular  attention to the role of  the trade size and customer identity in de- 
termining trading costs. 
In my view, the most important  innovation in the paper is the estimation 
technique  used to isolate trading  costs. Because the bid-ask  quotes seldom 
change, and because transaction reporting can be delayed, an important part of 
measuring transaction costs is the estimation of the discount offered from the 
touch. Reiss and Werner suggest a cost measure that is based on an immediate 
purchase and sale of the stock (or the converse). Using the current trade, they 
compute the apparent spread, which is the current quote less the discount on 
the first transaction. To get the round-trip trading costs, the authors then esti- 
mate the expected discount on the offsetting trade and subtract this amount 
from the  adjusted  spread.  This value,  defined  to be  the  adjusted apparent 
spread, becomes the trading cost of interest (although in their figures the au- 
thors only report the apparent spread value). This cost measure is an important 
innovation. It reflects the discount offered in the current trade, as well as the 
discount likely to be offered on the return trade. Importantly, it appears that 
the extent of the discount is related to the characteristics of the order in very 
interesting ways. 
Because of the emphasis on an empirical overview, Reiss and Werner spend 
less time discussing why the trading environment on the LSE evolved the way 
it has. They leave the details of a specific model for other research. This raises 
a natural question. If a specific model were to be tested, are Reiss and Werner’s 
techniques  likely to be useful  for a direct test of  that model? For example, 
Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan (1993) in a related paper suggest that  LSE 
market makers quote larger spreads and then execute trades inside the spread 
for three reasons: (1) following an informational  change, it gives the market 
makers some elbow room before they alter their quotes; (2)  it enables them to 
service customer orders without frequently  adjusting their quotes, and thus 
signaling their inventory; and (3) the process of negotiation reveals something 
about the identity of the customer as well as the motive of the trade. Does the 
current  work  of Reiss  and Werner  allow us any  additional insights  to these 
arguments? If not, what more needs to be done? 
Reiss and Werner condition on the information in the order flow and esti- 
mate trading costs using quantile regressions. For Cadbury Schweppes, this 
functional  form is given in expression  (2).  Specifically,  the authors use  the 
trade size and the interaction between the touch and the trade size, as well as 
the traders’ identity, to estimate the (adjusted) apparent spread. This bring us 171  Transaction Costs in Dealer Markets 
to the most controversial part of the paper. Why are these variables the correct 
ones to condition on? Why condition on them in this form (trade size and the 
interaction between trade size and touch)? Can this conditioning set be related 
to a theoretical model, or to the intuition given by Hansch, Naik, and Viswa- 
nathan? 
This complication  in choosing a conditioning  set becomes more complex 
when the authors estimate trading costs across a sample of stocks. Expression 
(3) gives the functional form used for such tests. At first it appears that they 
use expression (2)  and scale it by dividing both sides by the transaction price. 
However,  now  the authors condition on touch  and trade  size in  a different 
way-the  form of the interactions is significantly different. Little explanation 
is offered for the change, and it is not clear which specification is appropriate. 
This serves to highlight the need for a theoretical basis for quote formation on 
an interdealer market like the LSE. 
In summary, the paper provides a fascinating array of evidence on the market 
structure of  the LSE. In presenting  this information,  the authors raise more 
questions than any one paper can hope to address. The estimation procedure 
that is used is innovative in that it provides an economically relevant, forward- 
looking measure of costs. Its drawback, however, is that without a firm theoret- 
ical footing it is difficult to interpret, and will be controversial to many readers. 
Linked to a rigorous model of quote formation, this procedure promises to be 
an effective method of estimating costs. In my mind, the most interesting in- 
sight of the paper is “[bly widening spreads, SEAQ market makers can protect 
themselves against inventory imbalances and informed trades while simultane- 
ously retaining an option to offer execution within their guaranteed  quotes.” 
This insight echoes that of Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan (1993) and sug- 
gests an interesting path for theoretical  researchers  who wish to understand 
better interdealer competition. Interested theorists  should read Hagerty’s and 
McDonald’s chapter in this volume for a related theoretical paper. 
Reference 
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Comment  Bernard S. Black 
This paper has a lot of interesting data in it as well as the most careful measure 
of effective buy-sell spread that I’ve seen. It is no criticism of the authors to 
say that their data raises as many questions as it solves. 
Bernard S. Black is professor of  law at Columbia University Law School 172  Peter C. Reiss and Ingrid M. Werner 
One weakness is the theoretical model of competition among market makers 
as oligopolistic competition, of  the kind  that once characterized the steel or 
auto industry, where the oligopolists earn positive economic profits, or perhaps 
dissipate potential oligopoly profits through various inefficiencies. I think this 
is implausible. Entry costs into the business of  making a market in common 
stock are likely to be low by the standards of nonfinancial industries. For firms 
that are already  making markets  in other  stocks, entry costs into making a 
market in the stock of a particular company are surely small. 
So even if there are only a small number of market makers in the stock of 
ABC Corporation, there is lots of potential competition from broker-dealers 
who could become market makers in ABC Corporation if the market price of 
liquidity  services-the  effective buy-sell  spread-is  significantly  above the 
cost of producing this product. That potential competition ought to keep effec- 
tive buy-sell spreads close to competitive levels. 
How then does one explain the strong picture that the authors present in 
figure 5.6 of declining spreads with increasing number of market makers? The 
alternate story that I’d like to offer posits several features of market making. 
1.  Some costs associated with making a market in ABC Corporation stock 
are largely independent of trade volume, including keeping up with informa- 
tion about ABC’s business and about trading in ABC stock. These costs must 
be  borne even if  trading volume  is zero. At low trading volumes,  the need 
to recover these costs may significantly increase effective spreads. As trading 
volume increases, these costs become smaller per trade. 
2.  These information-collection  costs of  market making decline with  the 
number of other market makers. Market maker 17 can, in large part, skimp on 
its own research and instead rely on market transactions, and on quoted spreads 
from other market makers, to find out what’s happening in the market for ABC 
stock. Conversely, market maker 1, with a larger market share, can’t learn much 
from the behavior of piggybacking market makers like 17. So there can be an 
equilibrium where one or a few market makers enjoy high volume, which they 
use to cover their relatively  high information-gathering  costs, while  market 
makers like 17, with low volume, can offer competitive spreads because they 
incur low information-gathering costs. In this respect, market making is quite 
unlike conventional product markets, where competitor 17 can’t piggyback on 
the capital investments made by number  1. 
3. Some trades  are more information  intensive than  others.  On  average, 
larger trades will come from more knowledgeable traders. Market maker  17 
won’t dare handle these trades. These trades will primarily flow to market mak- 
ers like number  1 that invest heavily in gathering information. 
If  we had  the data to look behind the simple correlation that the authors 
present between effective spreads and the number of market makers, and could 
disaggregate the data, I would want to examine the market share of different 
market makers, broken down in various ways, including trade size. That might 173  Transaction Costs in Dealer Markets 
tell us whether the model of the industrial organization of market making that 
I’ve described captures some of  the truth-perhaps  more than the authors’ 
model of oligopolistic competition. 
This model,  where  small  market  makers  piggyback  on the  information- 
gathering efforts of  large market makers, could also provide a window  into 
one of  the puzzles in the data-why  doesn’t any one market maker offer a 
quoted spread equal to the touch? The combination of quoted spreads greater 
than  the  best  published  bid-ask  spread,  and  relatively  frequent  discounts, 
may  hide from other market makers some of the information that a particu- 
lar market maker has collected. That’s a speculation in search of  a model, I 
recognize. 
I would like also to comment on two surprising features of the data. First, 
we apparently have large-company percentage spreads of about 0.6 percent for 
S&P 100 stocks, on the NYSE, 0.9 percent on SEAQ for FTSE-100 stocks, 
and, depending on the study, between 1.2 percent and 2 percent on Nasdaq for 
large-company stocks. These are large differences, for markets that increas- 
ingly compete with each other, both for listings and order flow. 
I’d like to know whether these are really comparable numbers. If they are, 
then  I  would like to know  why these price differences  survive. One reason 
might be nonprice differences in the quality of  execution. Let me offer two 
examples. A thousand-share trade on the NYSE is exposed on the floor and 
sometimes is executed between the best quoted bid and the best quoted asking 
price. That narrows the effective spread. But it takes time-a  minute or two. 
Maybe speed of execution, which reduces transaction costs, explains why third 
markets can take transactions away from the NYSE even though their apparent 
price is higher. But this is not necessarily a happy outcome. The advantages of 
speed might accrue to the broker, not to the customers. 
There is a way to find out who benefits from sending trades to third markets, 
suggested by  Jack Coffee. The SEC could require brokers to offer clients an 
explicit choice: faster execution or the possibility of a better price. My bet: the 
vast majority of small investors would opt for a better price. 
Second example: informed traders like to hide their trades. Maybe London 
competes with the NYSE by offering secrecy, in return for a higher effective 
spread. We might prefer that delayed  transaction reporting  not  be  allowed. 
I’m one of  the people who think that price disclosure has important external 
benefits. But for present purposes, we could explain a difference in effective 
spreads based on these kinds of nonprice factors. 
Second  data  feature:  the  authors  report  that  “IDB  trades”-broker-to- 
broker-dealer  trades  intermediated  by  interdealer  brokers-occur  at  better 
prices than direct broker-to-broker trades. At first impression, this makes no 
sense. Shouldn’t it be, if anything, the other way around? 
Let me offer a possible explanation. The better pricing accorded to IDB 
trades  could  reflect  a  gentlemen’s understanding  that  only  informationless 
trades go through IDB. Such an understanding, even if it would break down in 174  Peter C. Reiss and Ingrid M. Werner 
the United States, could survive in the much more close-knit British investment 
community. IDB brokers could kick cheaters out of the club by refusing to take 
their orders.  Information trades would then  go direct broker to broker,  and 
properly get worse pricing. 
Here the authors ought to ask British dealers about the reasons that might 
underlie this difference. They might get a simple, plausible explanation rooted 
in price discrimination between high-information and low-information trades. 
Authors’ Reply 
Increased competition between exchanges for order flow has renewed debates 
about which trading systems offer “better execution.” As the discussion at this 
conference testifies, the quality of execution is a difficult concept to measure. 
Many studies regard the quality of  execution as synonymous with the spread 
cost of an average trade. Our paper illustrates why in dealer markets average 
comparisons may mask or, worse, obscure systematic differences in transaction 
costs. In particular, on SEAQ, the practice of discounting the posted  quotes 
raises new questions about how one should assess the quality of execution in 
dealer markets. We are grateful to our discussants and conference participants 
for their observations about our overall approach and our methods. We  now 
briefly revisit several of these points and relate them to our overall objective. 
We  began  studying SEAQ dealer markets thinking that we could use ex- 
isting models and measures to explain SEAQ dealer pricing policies. Inter- 
views  with  SEAQ officials  and market  makers  quickly  convinced  us  that 
SEAQ rules led to behavior not captured by standard models or measures. We 
thus began with a narrower objective, how to summarize these differences. Our 
adjusted apparent spread measure recognizes that both minimum quote sizes 
and best  execution  rules  affect quoted  spreads and  the  ultimate  relation  of 
transaction prices to quoted prices. 
Our paper emphasizes that one must condition comparisons of transaction 
costs on factors that dealers use when pricing trades. The estimations in this 
paper use simple quantile regression equations to make this point. As Douglas 
Foster  observes, these  specifications  should ideally come from a model of 
dealer behavior. They should probably also contain other variables. We agree. 
Unfortunately, we were unable to find a structural model in the literature that 
captures dealer interaction in markets like SEAQ. We also note that it will be 
difficult to obtain an empirically tractable model of dealer behavior. Neverthe- 
less, Foster’s point is well taken and is one we plan to pursue. Our regression 
results are thus best viewed as a first attempt at describing the facts that re- 
quire explanation. 
Besides the findings highlighted in Douglas Foster’s comment, we again em- 
phasize the important interactions between trade size and the touch at the time 175  Transaction Costs in Dealer Markets 
of trade. Medium to large trades receive favorable execution, whereas small 
and  very large trades  at best  get “best execution.”  Favorable  execution  in- 
creases, the wider the spread. These findings contrast with the predictions of 
some theoretical models and the results of previous empirical studies. As Fos- 
ter notes,  our  finding  that  quotes  change  infrequently  is  also noteworthy. 
Hansch, Naik, and Viswanathan (1993) also make this observation. While their 
story suggests reasons for why spreads might move infrequently, it does not 
explain why we see systematic patterns by the size of the touch, trade size, and 
trader identity. Finally, contrary to the predictions of some second-price auc- 
tion models, we find order flow does not always go to a SEAQ dealer advertis- 
ing the best price. There are at least two reasons for this. First, dealers have 
the option to take trades at the best bid and offer. Second, traders know that 
dealers discount. 
Bernard Black raises an interesting observation about market-maker trading 
and IDB discounts. We disagree, however, that what we observe is the result 
of a “gentlemen’s agreement” among SEAQ dealers. An alternative story, sug- 
gested to us by several market makers, is that market makers use direct negoti- 
ation only as a last resort. That is, they use the phone to resolve  inventory 
imbalances only after they have exhausted all other means. (These include all 
four IDBs and customers.) This explanation  suggests that the difference  in 
transaction costs we observe between phone trading and IDB trading reflects 
a dealer “impatience” cost. 
Black also rightly observes that we omit important nonprice differences in 
the quality of execution, such as the speed of execution (immediacy) and infor- 
mation disclosure. We  agree. We  did not mean to suggest that our apparent 
spreads capture all that is important. While we would like to measure these 
dimensions, it is very difficult to measure the speed of execution without time- 
stamped order information.  Similarly, it is difficult  to quantify the costs of 
reduced transparency without knowing where and when information arrives. 
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